yang-sec / privacyguard Goto Github PK

PrivacyGuard is a platform that combines blockchain smart contract and TEE to enable transparent enforcement of private data computation and fine-grained usage control. This repo includes prototype implementation and evaluation programs.

License: MIT License

Makefile 0.84% C++ 27.25% C 13.09% JavaScript 0.70% CMake 0.10% Python 0.28% Shell 0.01% Solidity 0.62% PHP 57.11%

data-usage privacy-protection smart-contract

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terry2012 jg3233 sandrakumi jmp0x7c00

privacyguard's Issues

[security]write data without checking malloc result.

Dear sir,

This code didn't check whether malloc() result is NULL and writed sensitive data to it,
as we know, the attacker can mmap the address 0, if the attacker do that, the sensitve data will be writed outside enclave.

in file PrivacyGuard/DataBroker/Enclave/enclave.cpp line ,vulnerability code is here:

sgx_status_t ECALL_enclave_DO_config(int num_DOs)
{
    int i;
    sgx_status_t ret = SGX_SUCCESS;

    sk_key_DO = (sgx_ec_key_128bit_t *) malloc(num_DOs * sizeof(sgx_ec_key_128bit_t));
    // here.
    // same issue to varaible sk_key_DO and DO_data_key_assigned 
    DO_data_key = (sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *) malloc(num_DOs * sizeof(sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t));
    DO_data_key_assigned = (bool *) malloc(num_DOs * sizeof(bool));

    for(i = 0; i < num_DOs; i++)
    {
        DO_data_key_assigned[i] = false;
    }

    return ret;
}

here sensitive data is writen:

if(!DO_data_key_assigned[DO_ID-1])
    {
        /* Generate a 16-Byte data encryption key for DO's data */
        sgx_read_rand(DO_data_key[DO_ID-1], sizeof(sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t));  //   the data encryption key will be leaked if malloc fails

[security] DataOwner's data is leaked

in file Enclave_testML/isv_enclave/isv_enclave.cpp:

sgx_status_t ECALL_compute_task1(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint8_t *p_data_encrypted,
    uint32_t data_size,
    uint8_t *p_data_gcm_mac,
    uint8_t *p_result_encrypted,
    uint32_t result_size,
    uint8_t *p_result_gcm_mac,
    uint8_t *p_rand_key_DC_encrypted,
    uint8_t *p_rand_key_DC_mac)
{
    sgx_status_t ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
    uint8_t aes_gcm_iv[12] = {0};
    uint8_t g_data[data_size];
    uint8_t result[result_size];
    int i;

    do{
        ret = sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt((const sgx_ec_key_128bit_t*) g_secret_iDA,
                                     p_data_encrypted,
                                     data_size,
                                     g_data,
                                     aes_gcm_iv,
                                     12,
                                     NULL,
                                     0,
                                     (const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t*) p_data_gcm_mac);
    }while(ret != SGX_SUCCESS);

    printf("\n[ENCLAVE] DataOwner's data are:\n"); // =====================>leak
    for(i = 0;i < data_size;i++)
    {
        printf("%c", g_data[i]);
    }

and here:

PrivacyGuard/DataBroker/Enclave/enclave.cpp

Line 490 in 94e888a

printf("0x%02X ", g_secret_DO[i]);

[security]DataConsumer's and DataOwner's secrets are leaked

hi,sir,
I think there is a security issue here:
in file Enclave_testML/isv_enclave/isv_enclave.cpp:

sgx_status_t ECALL_put_secret_data(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint8_t *p_secret,
    uint32_t secret_size,
    uint8_t *p_gcm_mac,
    uint32_t provisioner_type)
{
    sgx_status_t ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
    uint32_t i;
    
    uint8_t aes_gcm_iv[12] = {0};

    do {

        if(provisioner_type == 1) // DataConsumer
        {
            ret = sgx_ra_get_keys(context, SGX_RA_KEY_SK, &sk_key_DC);
            if(SGX_SUCCESS != ret)
            {
                printf("[ENCLAVE] Get keys failed.\n");
                break;
            }

            ret = sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(&sk_key_DC,
                                         p_secret,
                                         secret_size,
                                         &g_secret_DC[0],
                                         &aes_gcm_iv[0],
                                         12,
                                         NULL,
                                         0,
                                         (const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *)(p_gcm_mac));
            if (ret != SGX_SUCCESS)
            {
                printf("[ENCLAVE] 128GCM decrypt failed\n");
            }
// ------------------------------------------------------------------!!! INFORMATION LEAK HERE!!!
            printf("\n[ENCLAVE] DataConsumer's secret is:\n");
            for(i=0;i<secret_size;i++)
            {
                printf("0x%02X ", g_secret_DC[i]);
            }
            printf("\n");
        }
        else // iDataAgent
        {
            ret = sgx_ra_get_keys(context, SGX_RA_KEY_SK, &sk_key_iDA);
            if(SGX_SUCCESS != ret)
            {
                printf("[ENCLAVE] Get keys failed.\n");
                break;
            }

            ret = sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(&sk_key_iDA,
                                         p_secret,
                                         secret_size,
                                         &g_secret_iDA[0],
                                         &aes_gcm_iv[0],
                                         12,
                                         NULL,
                                         0,
                                         (const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *)(p_gcm_mac));


// ------------------------------------------------------------------!!! INFORMATION LEAK HERE!!!
            printf("\n[ENCLAVE] DataOwner's data key is:\n");
            for(i=0;i<secret_size;i++)
            {
                printf("0x%02X ", g_secret_iDA[i]);
            }
            printf("\n");
        }

        // Once the server has the shared secret, it should be sealed to
        // persistent storage for future use. This will prevents having to
        // perform remote attestation until the secret goes stale. Once the
        // enclave is created again, the secret can be unsealed.
    } while(0);
    return ret;
}

build error,missing libs

Hi,dear
some errors occurred when building PrivacyGuard:

PrivacyGuard/CEE/Makefile

Line 99 in 1ef665f

My_libopencv_untrusted_Name := sgx_ucv

PrivacyGuard/CEE/Makefile

Line 100 in 1ef665f

My_libsvm_u_Name := svm_u # the orginal libsvm.a, thus untrusted

log:

CXX  <=  service_provider/ecp.cpp
CXX  <=  service_provider/network_ra.cpp
CXX  <=  service_provider/service_provider.cpp
CXX  <=  service_provider/ias_ra.cpp
LINK =>  libservice_provider.so
GEN  =>  isv_app/isv_enclave_u.c
CC   <=  isv_app/isv_enclave_u.c
CXX  <=  isv_app/isv_app.cpp
CXX  <=  isv_app/operations.cpp
g++ isv_app/isv_enclave_u.o isv_app/isv_app.o isv_app/operations.o -o app -m64 -O0 -g -L/opt/intel/sgxsdk/lib64 -lsgx_urts -lsvm_u  -lsgx_ucv -L. -lsgx_ukey_exchange -lpthread -lservice_provider -Wl,-rpath=/home/test/PrivacyGuard-master/CEE/sample_libcrypto -Wl,-rpath=/home/test/PrivacyGuard-master/CEE -lsgx_uae_service
/usr/bin/ld: cannot find -lsvm_u
/usr/bin/ld: cannot find -lsgx_ucv
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
Makefile:256: recipe for target 'app' failed
make: *** [app] Error 1

yang-sec / privacyguard Goto Github PK

privacyguard's People

Contributors

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privacyguard's Issues

[security]write data without checking malloc result.

[security] DataOwner's data is leaked

[security]DataConsumer's and DataOwner's secrets are leaked

build error,missing libs

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